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Epidemic containment is a major concern when confronting large-scale infections in complex
networks. Many works have been devoted to analytically understand how to restructure the
network to minimize the impact of major outbreaks of infections at large scale. In many cases,
the strategies consist in the isolation of certain nodes, while less attention has been paid to the
intervention on links. In epidemic spreading, links inform about the probability of carrying the
contagion of the disease from infected to susceptible individuals. Note that these states depend on
the full structure of the network, and its determination is not straightforward from the knowledge
of nodes’ states. Here, we confront this challenge and propose a set of discrete-time governing
equations which can be closed and analyzed, assessing the contribution of links to spreading
processes in complex networks. Our approach allows an scheme for the containment of epidemics,
based on deactivating the most important links in transmitting the disease. The model is validated
in synthetic and real networks, obtaining an accurate determination of the epidemic incidence
and the critical thresholds. Epidemic containment based on links’ deactivation promises to be an
effective tool to maintain functionality on networks while controlling the spread of diseases, as for
example in air transportation networks.
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Introduction
The problem of modeling the spread of a disease among individuals has been studied in depth over many years [1–4].
The development of compartmental models, models which divide the individuals among a set of possible states, has
given rise to a new collection of techniques that enable, for instance, the analysis of the onset of epidemics [5–15] or
the study of the impact of a vaccination campaign [16–20]. Previous works heavily rely on a mathematical approach
to the study of epidemic spreading [21] and here we follow the same spirit.
The design of effective containment strategies constitutes a major challenge. Measures like vaccination, improved
hygiene, bio-security, cattle culling, or education to prevent contagions, operate on the biological aspects of the
disease. On the other hand, isolation or mobility restrictions act on the physical spreading channels, which may
transform a local event into a pandemic. Here, we concentrate on the role of the links of the spreading network. For
example, if we identify the edges which are more involved in the propagation of a disease, it is possible to design
targeted countermeasures which affect just specific links instead of whole nodes, while being more effective. This can
be illustrated by a hypothetical pandemic disease propagated using the air transportation network: the isolation of
one airport is a dramatic measure which is socially and politically difficult to accept and put into practice, but the
suspension of just a few connections between selected airports could be more easily assumed, and at the same time
achieving a better containment of the disease.
Previous works have directed their attention mostly towards schemes based on the actuation on single nodes, either
randomly or according to node properties such as their degree, betweenness, PageRank or eigenvector centrality [22–
25]. Following the same idea, some authors have introduced link removal using properties of the adjacent nodes
(degrees or centralities) or of the link itself (edge betweenness) [22, 26, 27]. A model of coevolution of epidemics
with permanent and temporal link removals was proposed in [28], and methods from optimization and control have
been applied to minimize the impact of the epidemics [29–31]. Currently, it is considered that the optimal approach
consists in finding the minimum set of edges whose removal leads to a maximum decrease of the spectral radius of the
network, i.e., the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix [27, 32, 33]. Since the epidemic threshold is, at first order
approximation of a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemic dynamics, inverse to the spectral radius, it seems
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FIG. 1. Incidence of the epidemic process ρ as a function of the infection probability β. We show the incidence level
for the ELE model (solid lines) and for Monte Carlo simulations (circles). The theoretical epidemic threshold calculated using
equation (19) is marked with a vertical line. We have made use of two synthetic and two real networks: two scale-free networks
(top) with exponent 3, one of them with high clustering coefficient; the world air transportation network; and the network of
scientific collaborations in the field of general relativity. We have set the recovery rate for all the networks to µ = 0.5. See
Methods for the description of the networks and the details of the Monte Carlo simulations.
the best and more mathematically grounded option. Unfortunately, it turns out to be an NP-complete problem, thus
only heuristics are available for large networks [27].
It must be emphasized that all the previous approaches make use only of the structural characteristics of the
network to decide which nodes or edges have to be removed; the characteristics or parameters of the epidemic process
are ignored. Even the spectral radius, which is closely related to the epidemic threshold, does not depend on the
infection or recovery rates, the expected number of infected neighbors around a certain node, or any other local or
global information of the spreading process.
Our proposal concentrates on the role of the links in the spreading of the epidemics, quantifying the importance
of each link [34], thus enabling containment strategies based on their removal. To this end, we first define the
epidemic importance of a link as its capacity to infect other individuals once this link has been used to propagate
the disease. The determination of this link epidemic importance requires the development of a mathematical model
able to cope with the infection propagation at the level of links in complex networks. We will show that the proposed
model facilitates the determination of the epidemics incidence and threshold with high accuracy. Moreover, the
quantification of the epidemic importance of the edges leads to a link removal strategy which in many cases outperforms
the previous approaches, even those based on minimizing the spectral radius, and preserving at the same time most
of the connectivity of the network.
The contributed model is built upon the relationships between the states of nodes connected by links, thus being
related to pairwise approximations [35–41]. However, our model is microscopic, at the level of individual links as
in [40], thus allowing for a clear identification of maximally infectious links, but with the additional advantage of
being able to easily calculate the incidence of the epidemics and the importance of the links, not just the epidemic
threshold.
3Results
Link Epidemic Importance
Let us consider a discrete time SIS dynamics which runs on top of a complex network of N nodes and L edges,
with adjacency matrix A, and where each node i can be in one of two different states σi, either susceptible (S) or
infected (I), i.e. σi ∈ {S, I}. We can say that a link (i, j) between nodes i and j is in state SI if σi = S and σj = I.
The parameters of the SIS dynamics are the infection and recovery probabilities, β and µ, respectively.
Our objective is to find an effective strategy to contain the SIS epidemic process through bond percolation. To
determine which link should be removed first, we need a measure of the importance of each link in the spreading of
the epidemics. A possible option would be to use the edge importance defined in [34], which accounts for the relative
change of the spectral radius when the edge is removed. However, this constitutes an indirect way of containment,
since we aim at lowering the incidence of the epidemics as much as possible, whereas the actuation on the spectral
radius is directed to increase the epidemic threshold; both are different targets. Additionally, the spectral radius just
depends on the structure of the network, but not on the epidemic parameters of the process nor the participation of
the link in the spreading of the disease.
We assume the system has reached the stationary state, which does not mean that the nodes remain in a certain
fixed state, just that the average incidence of the epidemics is basically constant; thus, there is still margin for applying
a containment strategy to minimize this incidence. In this regime, we can measure which are the probabilities of nodes
and links to be in each of the epidemic states, e.g. the probability P (σi = I) of node i being infected, or the joint
probability P (σi = I, σj = S) of link (i, j) being in state IS.
Consider we have a link in state SS or II. In both cases, the next step of the epidemic dynamics is not going to
use this link, since in the former there is no infected node to propagate the disease, and in the latter both nodes are
already infected. Thus, to propagate the epidemics, a link must be either in an SI or IS state. Let us suppose we
have a link (i, j) in state IS. First, with probability β, node i can infect node j through this link, changing to state
II. Next, infected node j may transmit the disease to some of its neighbors. Thus, if we had removed link (i, j), we
would have cut this path of infections initiated at node i. This means that, the larger the expected number of infected
neighbors of node j, the largest the impact of removing link (i, j) for the spreading of the epidemics. Note that not
only the degree of j is relevant, but also the probability of its neighbors being susceptible when j is infected, since you
cannot infect nodes which are already infected. For example, if j is surrounded by many infected nodes, cutting link
(i, j) is not going to have too much effect on the overall incidence of the epidemics. The expected number of infected
nodes produced in this way can be expressed as
n¯ij = βP (σj = S, σi = I)
N∑
r=1
AjrβP (σr = S|σj = I) , (1)
where P (σr = S|σj = I) is the conditional probability that node r is susceptible when its neighbor j is infected. Since
this measure is asymmetric, and removing an edge affects the propagation of the disease in both directions, we define
the link epidemic importance of a link, Iij , as
Iij = n¯ij + n¯ji . (2)
Now, the problem reduces to finding the joint and conditional probabilities for each link, and this is accomplished
using our Epidemic Link Equations (ELE). It can be shown that this definition of link epidemic importance has the
property of trying to preserve the connectivity of the network (see section S1 and fig. S1), unlike other options such
as edge betweenness, which quickly tend to produce a large number of disconnected components, thus hindering the
functionality of the network.
Epidemic Link Equations
To simplify the notation, we first denote the previous joint probability as Φij = P (σi = S, σj = I); the higher the
Φij , the larger the likelihood that the disease propagates from node j to node i. It is worth mentioning that this
feature is in general asymmetrical, meaning that the propagation of the illness can be more probable from j to i than
the other way around. In the same way, the epidemic is restrained by edges where the nodes are in the same state,
thus it is convenient to define the probabilities ΘSij = P (σi = σj = S) and Θ
I
ij = P (σi = σj = I) for all pairs of
neighboring nodes.
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FIG. 2. Targeted bond percolation. We show the incidence of the epidemics, ρ, and the number of connected components,
Cr, as function of the occupation probability, Lr/L0, where L0 is the number of links of the network and Lr the number of
removed edges in the bond percolation process. We compare five different epidemic containment strategies: removing the edges
of the node with highest probability of being infected, P (σi = I) (orange dash-dash line); a random edge removal (yellow
dash-dot line); removing the edge with highest edge-betweenness (light orange dotted line); targeting the edge with highest
eigenscore (red dashed line); and finally, removing the edge which has the largest link epidemic importance (blue solid line).
We apply these processes to the same networks as in Fig. 1 (see Methods). We have set the recovery rate to µ = 0.5 and
chosen the infection probability β such that the stationary incidence of the epidemics is about ρini ≈ 0.2 for all the networks,
i.e. β = 0.1 for both power-law networks, β = 0.06 for air transportation network, and β = 0.11 for the collaboration network.
The dots mark the achievement of total containment.
The evolution of the joint probability Φij of one link depends on the probabilities Φ, Θ
I and ΘS to the rest of the
neighboring links, and the infection rules of the SIS dynamics. Thus, we can write the following equation for each
link:
Φij(t+ 1) = Θ
S
ij(t) qij(t) (1− qji(t))
+ Φij(t) ((1− β)qij(t)) (1− µ)
+ Φji(t)µ (1− (1− β)qji(t))
+ ΘIij(t)µ(1− µ) (3)
where qij(t) stands for the probability that a susceptible node i is not infected by any of its neighbors (excluding
node j). We have taken into account all the possible changes of state of the nodes i and j. The first term considers
the probability that both nodes are in a susceptible state, and then node i remaining susceptible while node j is
infected by any of its other neighbors. The second term accounts for both nodes remaining in the same state, node i
is not infected by any of its neighbors and node j is not recovered from the infection. Then, the third term represents
5the transition in which node i is infected and recovers while node j is susceptible and it is infected by any of its
other neighbors. Finally, in the fourth term both nodes are infected but node i recovers while node j does not. The
asymmetry of probability Φij multiplies the number of equations by two, since for each link between nodes i and j
we need an equation for Φij(t+ 1) and another for Φji(t+ 1).
Similarly we can obtain an expression for probability ΘIij :
ΘIij(t+ 1) = Θ
S
ij(t) (1− qij(t)) (1− qji(t))
+ Φij(t) (1− (1− β)qij(t)) (1− µ)
+ Φji(t) (1− µ) (1− (1− β)qji(t))
+ ΘIij(t) (1− µ)2 (4)
In this case we have only L equations, one per link, due to its symmetry. There is no need of extra equations for
probability ΘSij since the normalization leads to Θ
S
ij = 1− Φij − Φji −ΘIij .
The qij(t) in equations (3) and (4) can be expressed as:
qij(t) =
N∏
r=1
r 6=j
(1− βArihir) (5)
where hij defines the hostility of j against i, i.e. the probability that node j is infected when node i is susceptible,
hij = P (σj = I|σi = S). The hostility can be obtained in terms of ΘSij and Φij as:
hij =
Φij
Φij + ΘSij
(6)
Note that the denominator in equation (6) is a property of node i given that Φij+Θ
S
ij = P (σi = S) for all neighboring
nodes j of vertex i.
We call this system of 3L equations and unknowns our Epidemic Link Equations (ELE) model. It can be solved by
iteration, starting from any meaningful initial condition, e.g. ΘIij(0) = ρ
2
0 and Φij(0) = Φji(0) = ρ0(1 − ρ0) (for any
0 < ρ0 ≤ 1), until a fixed point is found. Apart from the solution where all nodes are susceptible, ΘSij = 1 for all the
links, a non-trivial one appears when the system is above the critical value of the epidemic spreading (see Methods for
the analytic derivation of the epidemic threshold from ELE model). Finally, the incidence of the epidemic process,
the average number of infected nodes in the whole system, can be computed as:
ρ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
ki
N∑
j=1
Aji(Φji + Θ
I
ij) (7)
where ki is the degree of node i.
To test the agreement between our approach and empirical simulations we have analyzed the incidence of the
epidemics, ρ, in different synthetic and real network structures, covering the full range of infection probabilities, β,
see Fig. 1. The results show a remarkable agreement between our ELE model and the Monte Carlo simulations, and
a good prediction of the epidemic threshold for all synthetic and real networks, pointing out the validity of our model
to describe the global impact of the epidemics. Note that all networks, except the first one, have a large clustering
coefficient, making the determination of the incidence difficult for standard mean field methods, due to the effect of
dynamical correlations.
Epidemic Containment
Our approach for effective epidemic containment consists in removing the links with largest link epidemic impor-
tance. This is possible once we have solved the ELE model, computing the Iij for all the links in the network using
equation (2), which can be expressed as
Iij = β
2
(
Φji
N∑
r=1
Ajr
Φrj
Φrj + ΘIrj
+ Φij
N∑
r=1
Air
Φri
Φri + ΘIri
)
. (8)
Note that the value of β does not affect the ranking of the links, but we do not remove it from equation (8) to preserve
the semantics of Iij . Since the structure of the network changes after each link removal, it is convenient to recalculate
the solution of the ELE model to ensure that we really remove the current link with largest link epidemic importance.
6FIG. 3. Epidemic containment on the air transportation network. We show the networks after 33.3% of the links
have been removed using link epidemic importance (top) and edge betweenness (bottom). Nodes and edges with the same
color belong to the same connected component, with subcritical components in gray scale and using darker gray for larger
components. The area of the nodes is proportional to their probability of being infected P (σi = I) from 0.0 to 0.6. We have
set the epidemic probabilities to µ = 0.5 and β = 0.06.
We show the results of our approach for epidemic containment in Fig. 2. For comparison purposes, we also test
four additional containment strategies. First, two strategies which just consider the structure of the network: removal
based on maximal edge betweenness [22], and targeting the link with highest eigenscore, i.e., the product of the
eigenvector centralities of the nodes connected by the link [27]. Then, we consider a measure based on the epidemic
process at the level of nodes, the removal of all the links of the node which has maximal probability of being infected.
Finally, a simple random edge removal. As in the case of our strategy, we recalculate all the measures after each
removal (see Methods for further details). We have also checked a promising approach based on communicability
distances [44], however the computational costs involved in computing communicability angles and distances for large
networks preclude this approach to be used in large networks, for this reason we have not included results on this one.
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FIG. 4. Fraction of links removed for total epidemic containment on synthetic networks. We show the fraction
of links which have to be removed to obtain total epidemic containment using link epidemic importance, compared with the
fractions for the other four strategies: (A) eigenscore; (B) edge betweenness; (C) node infectivity; (D) random removal. Each
point represents a configuration consisting of a network and a set of epidemic parameters. The networks have been generated
with the model in [42], which interpolates between Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (α = 1) and Baraba´si-Albert networks (α = 0). We use four
values of the interpolating parameter: α = 0.0, 0.33, 0.67, 1.0. These networks are generated in four sizes (N = 1000, 2500,
5000, 10000) and three average degrees (〈k〉 = 4, 8, 16), thus amounting 48 different networks. For each network, we apply the
five containment strategies for three different values of the recovery probability (µ = 0.25, 0.50, 0.75), and four values of the
infection probability β selected such that, before removing links, the incidence of the epidemics at the stationary state is equal
to ρini = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4. Therefore, each plot contains 576 different configurations.
We observe in Fig. 2 that link epidemic importance leads to the fastest extinction of the epidemics for the four
considered networks, and it is the only method which preserves their connectivity (thus, functionality). Note that the
strategy based on node infectivity performs poorly for all the networks despite having information about the epidemic
process, although better than the random removal. This means that the use of information at the level of links is
crucial to contain the epidemics.
For the power-law network, our approach using link epidemic importance yields the best performance, but the
results are very similar to the ones obtained using eigenscore and edge betweenness strategies (equivalent results hold
for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, see fig. S6). However, when the transitivity of the network is increased, we can clearly see
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FIG. 5. Fraction of links removed for total epidemic containment on real networks. We compare the link epidemic
importance and eigenscore methods on a set of 27 real networks selected from the Network Repository [43] (see Methods), with
sizes ranging from 410 to 404719 nodes. The epidemic parameters are the same as in Fig. 4, thus amounting 324 different
configurations.
the benefits of using link epidemic importance, both in epidemic containment and on preservation of the connectivity
of the network (see figs. S2 and S3 for more details on the containment process for each method).
The effect of the clustering coefficient is also present when we look at the epidemic containment results for the two
empirical networks in Fig. 2. Moreover, as in most real networks, the air transportation and the scientific collaborations
networks have a significant modular structure. This plays an important role on the epidemic containment process.
Here, we can see how the strategy based on edge betweenness apparently performs better when few links are removed,
due to the fact that links with higher edge betweenness are those connecting different modules [45]. When the bond
percolation process isolates modules, each module may sustain its own epidemic process, and thus it may happen
that some of the modules are subcritical for the given infection probability β. That will lead to a decrease of the
global prevalence of the epidemics at expenses of loosing the connectivity of the network. Furthermore, if we look at
the prevalence on the giant connected component, an important increase above the initial average number of infected
individuals is revealed (see figs. S4 and S5). A consequence of this fragmentation process is the appearance of multiple
isolated supercritical components, for which the removal of a link in one of them does not affect the incidence on the
other components. As a result, the edge betweenness procedure needs to remove more links to arrive to the total
epidemic extinction than any of the other methods, even the random one. For the sake of completeness we have
analyzed two benchmark networks with community structure, obtaining similar results (see figs. S7 and S8).
In Fig. 3 (top) we illustrate the survival links in the air transportation network after 33.3% of the edges have been
removed according to our epidemic containment strategy proposal (see fig. S9 for the original network before the
containment process). As it is observed, the global connectivity, and thus functionality, of the worldwide connections
is preserved (links of the same color are part of the same connected component). In Fig. 3 (bottom) we plot the
network after deactivating the same fraction of links (33.3%) using the recursive deactivation of links according to
edge betweenness. The edge betweenness containment method, in contrast with our proposal, generates two main
9kinds of components: small or sparsely connected subcritical modules like the ones in Australia, Africa or South
America, where the epidemics vanishes; and large supercritical communities in Europe, North America and Easter
Asia, with a large prevalence of the epidemics. This means that, for instance, there is no path to go from London to
New York, or from Tokyo to Los Angeles, thus disconnecting the world by air transportation.
For a better assessment of the performance of the different containment strategies, we show in Fig. 4 their comparison
in terms of the required fraction of removed links to attain total containment, LTC/L0, when applied to a large
set of synthetic networks and epidemic parameters. The results point to a clear advantage of the link epidemic
importance method over the node infectivity and random approaches, and better or equal results with respect to edge
betweenness and eigenscore. In fact, only eigenscore achieves results comparable to link epidemic importance, with a
slight advantage for our method. When applied to a set of 27 real networks (see Methods), the differences between
link epidemic importance and eigenscore become more evident, showing again the effectiveness of our approach, but
with some exceptions in which eigenscore performs better, see Fig. 5. Additionally, we plot in figs. S10 and S11 the
comparison of the number of connected components between the different containment strategies, which show the
better performance of link epidemic importance to keep low the number of components, with just a few exceptions.
Discussion
We have presented a methodology for assessing epidemic spreading based on links instead of nodes. The model,
named Epidemic Link Equations (ELE), allows the determination of the epidemic importance of each link in trans-
mitting the disease. The method accounts for the first order correlations between links, although it could be extended
to higher orders assuming a larger analytical and computational cost. The results are used to develop an epidemic
containment strategy consisting in deactivating recursively the links with largest link epidemic importance while pre-
serving the connectivity of the full network, i.e. avoiding fragmentation. We have validated our proposal in synthetic
and empirical networks, comparing with other alternative containment strategies, which show its better performance,
with few exceptions. In the empirical case of the worldwide air transportation network, we identify the most important
connections between airports for the spreading of epidemics and evaluate the epidemic incidence after its deactivation,
considering an SIS epidemic spreading dynamics. Our results open the door to new approaches in the analysis of
dynamical diffusive-like models on complex networks at the level of links instead of nodes.
Methods
Epidemic Threshold
The determination of the epidemic threshold is performed by considering a state of the system in which the epidemic
incidence is very small (Φij ,Φji,Θ
I
ij  1, for all links), thus the system of equations can be linearized (See section S2
for full details), resulting in:
ΘIij = β(1− µ)Φij + β(1− µ)Φji + (1− µ)2ΘIij (9)
Φij = β
∑
r
(Arj − (1− µ)δri)Φjr
+ (1− β)(1− µ)Φij + µ(1− µ)ΘIij (10)
Here we have removed the dependence on time, to emphasize we are considering the steady state. From equation (9)
we can write
ΘIij =
β(1− µ)
µ(2− µ) (Φij + Φji) (11)
Now, calling εi = Φji + Θ
I
ij  1, which does not depend on node j since P (σi = I, σj = S) + P (σi = I, σj = I) =
P (σi = I), we make the following ansatz:
ΘIij = Υ(εi + εj) (12)
Φij = Xεi + Zεj (13)
where Υ, X and Z are constants independent of the link. These ansatz include the assumption of symmetry ΘIij
and asymmetry of Φij , respectively. We can determine the constants by substitution in equation (11) and using the
10
definition of εi, which leads to
Υ =
β(1− µ)
µ(2− µ) + 2β(1− µ) (14)
X = −Υ (15)
Z = 1−Υ (16)
Finally, we build equations for the εi by substituting equations (9) and (10) in εi = Φji + Θ
I
ij , and using the ansatz.
The result is
µ
β
εi =
∑
j
Bjiεj (17)
where B is a matrix whose elements depend on the adjacency matrix of the network, on Υ and on the degrees ki of
the nodes:
Bij = (1−Υ)Aij −Υkiδij (18)
The δij stands for the Kronecker delta function, which is 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise. If µ/β is an eigenvalue of matrix
B, equation (17) has a non-trivial solutions. Hence, the onset of the epidemics βc, the lowest value of β which yields
non-trivial solutions of equation (17), is given by
βc =
µ
Λmax(B)
(19)
where Λmax(B) is the largest eigenvalue of matrix B. Note that matrix B depends on β and µ, thus equation (19) is
implicit for βc, which can be solved by iteration. See section S3 for a discussion on the determination of the epidemic
threshold.
Estimation of the incidence of the epidemic from numerical simulations
The numerical incidence of the epidemics, ρ, is calculated using discrete-time and synchronous Monte Carlo simula-
tions. We make use of the quasistationary approach (QS) [46, 47] to avoid the effect that large number of realizations
end up in the absorbing state with no infected individuals in the system. Basically, the QS method focus the simulation
on active configurations, i.e. with one or more infected individuals. Every time the system reaches the absorbing state,
this state is replaced by one of the previously stored active states of the system. We keep 50 active configurations
with an update probability of 0.20. We give the systems a transient time of 105 time steps and then, we calculate the
ρ as an average over a relaxation time of 2× 104 time steps.
Networks
In this work, we evaluate our methodology on synthetic and empirical networks. We have built a network with
power-law degree distribution P (k) ∼ k−γ with exponent γ = 3 and 〈k〉 = 6 using the configuration model. To
evaluate the impact of transitivity we have also built another network with the same characteristics of the previous
one but with a clustering coefficient of 0.6 using the algorithm by Holme et al. [48] with a parameter p = 0.8.
We consider also two empirical networks: the air transportation network, and the network of scientific collaborations
in the field of general relativity. The air transportation network has been constructed using data from website
openflights.org which has information about the traffic between airports updated to 2012. This network accounts
for the largest connected component, with 3154 nodes and 18592 edges (see data file S1). The network of scientific
collaborations has been obtained from [49]; it is composed by 5242 nodes linked by 14496 edges.
The synthetic networks in Fig. 4 have been generated with the model in [42], which interpolates between Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
(ER) and Baraba´si-Albert (BA) networks. In this way, we are able to evaluate the performance of the containment
strategies on networks with degree distributions which range from Poisson (ER) to power-law (BA). By constructon,
these networks have no community structure and low transitivity.
The 27 real networks in Fig. 5 have been obtained from the Network Repository [43], selecting only the largest
connected component. They cover wide ranges of number of nodes (from 410 to 404719), number of links (from
1043 to 713319), average degree (between 2.04 and 84.82), average clustering coefficient (from 0.0023 to 0.1105) and
assortativity (between -0.88 and 0.64), see section S4.
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Containment process
To perform the deactivation of links, we impose an adiabatic process: after each removal step we let the system
converge to the meta-stable equilibrium before removing any other link. For a fair comparison between different
containment strategies, we remove on each deactivation step as many edges as we have removed using the node
infectivity strategy. In the case of the real networks in Fig. 5, we have set the maximum number of adiabatic
processes to 1000, due to its large computational cost on the largest networks. This means that, if the network has
20000 links, we remove 20 links at each deactivation steps. We consider we have reached total containment when the
incidence of the epidemics becomes lower than 1/N . The computational cost of calculating the links to remove for
each containment strategy is shown in fig. S13.
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Supplementary materials
Section S1. Link epidemic importance and connected components
One important property of our proposed definition of link epidemic importance is that it tends to maintain the
connectivity of the network when the selected link is removed. Here we show that, when the network is formed by
two subnetworks A and B, which are connected by just one link (iA, jB), the link epidemic importance of that link is
lower than that of another link internal to A or B. This means our containment strategy of removing the edge with
largest link epidemic importance will not break the network in two disconnected components A and B, unlike the
betweenness approach, for which the link (iA, jB) plays the role of a bridge and thus it has maximal edge betweenness.
Let 〈k〉A and 〈k〉B be the average degrees of subnetworks A and B, respectively, with 〈k〉A > 〈k〉B . Let us also call
ρA and ρB their respective incidence of the epidemics. The link epidemic importance of a link between nodes i and j
has been defined as
Iij = n¯ij + n¯ji , (S.1)
where
n¯ij = βP (σj = S, σi = I)
N∑
r=1
AjrβP (σr = S|σj = I) . (S.2)
Supposing independence of the states of the nodes, n¯ij can be approximated as
n¯ij ≈ βP (σj = S)P (σi = I)
N∑
r=1
AjrβP (σr = S) . (S.3)
In a homogeneous mean field approximation we may substitute kj = 〈k〉, P (σi = I) ≈ ρ, and P (σj = S) ≈ 1 − ρ,
which lead to the following expressions for the importance of a link:
IA ≈ 2β2ρA(1− ρA)2〈k〉A , (S.4)
IB ≈ 2β2ρB(1− ρB)2〈k〉B , (S.5)
IAB ≈ β2 [ρA(1− ρB)2〈k〉B + ρB(1− ρA)2〈k〉A] . (S.6)
Here, IA and IB denote the link epidemic importance of links inside A and B, respectively, and IAB the link epidemic
importance of the link connecting subnetworks A and B.
We need an expression relating the average degree 〈k〉 and the incidence of the epidemics ρ to be able to calcu-
late the approximate values of the link epidemic importances in Eqs. (S.4) to (S.6). It can be obtained using the
nonperturbative heterogeneous mean field (npHMF) equations in [Go´mez et al., Phys. Rev. E, 84 (2011) 036105]. In
particular, the npHMF equations for the SIS model without one-step reinfections (WOR) read as
0 = −µρk + (1− ρk)(1− qk) , (S.7)
qk =
∏
k′
(1− βρk′)Ckk′ , (S.8)
where ρk represents the fraction of infected nodes of degree k, qk the probability that nodes of degree k are not
infected by nodes of any other degree k′, and Ckk′ = kP (k′|k) the expected number of links from a node of degree k
to nodes of degree k′. In the nonperturbative homogeneous mean field (npHoMF) approximation, this reduces to
0 = −µρ+ (1− ρ)(1− q) , (S.9)
q = (1− βρ)〈k〉 . (S.10)
Thus, after some algebra we get
〈k〉 =
log
(
1− µ ρ
1− ρ
)
log(1− βρ) . (S.11)
An immediate consequence of Eq. (S.11) is that 0 6 ρ 6 1/(1 + µ). We can see a plot of the npHoMF relationship
between ρ and 〈k〉 in the inset of Fig. S1. Note that ρ is an increasing function of 〈k〉, thus the larger the average
degree, the greater the incidence of the epidemics.
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Now, we can substitute Eq. (S.11) for 〈k〉A and 〈k〉B into Eqs. (S.4) to (S.6) to obtain approximations of the three
different link epidemic importances. The results are presented in Fig. S1. Fixing a certain average degree 〈k〉B for
subnetwork B, we consider subnetworks A with 〈k〉A > 〈k〉B . Since ρ increases with 〈k〉, this is equivalent to fixing ρB
and consider subnetworks A with ρA > ρB . We observe that, in all cases, the link epidemic importance IA of links in
subnetwork A is larger than IAB of the bridge link between subnetworks A and B (IA > IAB), thus confirming that
our epidemic containment strategy driven by link epidemic importance does not disconnect the network. This result
has been obtained under independence and homogeneous mean field approximations, and for a specific structural
configuration of the network. In practice, we observe that the epidemic containment approach based on link epidemic
importance is the one considered which better preserves the connectivity of the networks, as shown in Figs. S10
and S11.
Section S2. Linearization of the ELE model
The determination of the epidemic threshold from the Epidemic Link Equations (ELE) requires the consideration
of states in which the probabilities of having infected nodes are very small, i.e. Φij ,Φji,Θ
I
ij  1. Therefore, we may
suppose that Φij ,Φji,Θ
I
ij ∼ O(ε), with ε  1, and in consequence ΘSij ∼ 1 − O(ε). Using these approximations the
epidemic link equations become linear in these O(ε) probabilities, since O(ε2) terms should be neglected.
We start with the linearization of the hostility:
hij =
Φij
Φij + ΘSij
=
Φij
1− (Φji + ΘIij)
= Φij
(
1 + Φji + Θ
I
ij +O(ε
2)
)
= Φij +O(ε
2) , (S.12)
where we have used the normalization Φij + Φji + Θ
I
ij + Θ
S
ij = 1, and we realize that terms ΦijΦji and ΦijΘ
I
ij are
both O(ε2). Substituting hostility in the expression for qij we get:
qij =
N∏
r=1
r 6=j
(1− βArihir)
=
N∏
r=1
r 6=j
(
1− βAriΦir +O(ε2)
)
= 1− β
N∑
r=1
r 6=j
AriΦir +O(ε
2)
= 1− β
N∑
r=1
Ari(1− δrj)Φir +O(ε2) , (S.13)
where the Kronecker δrj has been introduced to make zero the jth term of the sum. Now we are in condition to find
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the linear approximations of the main ELE model equations. First, the equation for ΘIij becomes:
ΘIij = Θ
S
ij (1− qij) (1− qji)
+ Φij (1− (1− β)qij) (1− µ)
+ Φji (1− µ) (1− (1− β)qji)
+ ΘIij (1− µ)2
= O(ε2)
+ Φij β(1− µ) +O(ε2)
+ Φji (1− µ)β +O(ε2)
+ ΘIij (1− µ)2
= β(1− µ) Φij + β(1− µ) Φji + (1− µ)2 ΘIij +O(ε2) . (S.14)
Note that, for the terms with a factor Φij , Φji or Θ
I
ij , which are O(ε), we just need to keep O(1) contributions in the
rest of the term, thus we may use the approximations qij = qji = 1 +O(ε).
The equation for Φij reads:
Φij = Θ
S
ij qij(1− qji)
+ Φij ((1− β)qij) (1− µ)
+ Φji µ (1− (1− β)qji)
+ ΘIij µ(1− µ)
= β
N∑
r=1
Arj(1− δri) Φjr +O(ε2)
+ Φij (1− β)(1− µ) +O(ε2)
+ Φji µβ +O(ε
2)
+ ΘIij µ(1− µ)
= β
N∑
r=1
(Arj(1− δri) + µδri) Φjr
+ Φij (1− β)(1− µ) + ΘIij µ(1− µ) +O(ε2)
= β
N∑
r=1
(Arj − (1− µ)δri) Φjr + (1− β)(1− µ) Φij + µ(1− µ) ΘIij +O(ε2) . (S.15)
For the last step we have made use of Arjδri = Aijδri = δri, since these equations correspond to a link between
nodes i and j, thus we are implicitly assuming that Aij = 1.
Summarizing, the linearized equations of the ELE model can be expressed as:
ΘIij = β(1− µ) Φij + β(1− µ) Φji + (1− µ)2 ΘIij , (S.16)
Φij = β
N∑
r=1
(Arj − (1− µ)δri) Φjr + (1− β)(1− µ) Φij + µ(1− µ) ΘIij . (S.17)
Section S3. Epidemic threshold
We have shown in Methods that the epidemic threshold is obtained by finding the non-trivial solutions of the system
of equations
µ
β
i =
∑
j
Bjij , (S.18)
where the components of matrix B read
Bij = (1−Υ)Aij −Υkiδij , (S.19)
16
with the constant Υ being
Υ =
β(1− µ)
µ(2− µ) + 2β(1− µ) . (S.20)
The non-trivial solutions of Eq. (S.18) require µβ to be an eigenvalue Λ(B) of matrix B:
Λ(B) =
µ
β
(S.21)
Unfortunately, for any given fixed value of the recovery rate µ, matrix B also depends on the infection rate β through
Υ, thus Eq. (S.21) becomes an implicit equation for β. Moreover, since we are interested in the onset of the epidemics,
we must find the lowest value of the infection probability, βc, which satisfies Eq. (S.21). At first sight, one would say
that we must choose the maximum eigenvalue of B to obtain the lowest value of β. However, the dependence of B on
β may rise the question whether a different eigenvalue (e.g., the second largest eigenvalue) could solve the equation
at a lower value of β, since each eigenvalue has a different functional form.
We show in Fig. S12 that, no matter the functional form of the eigenvalues of B on β, if there exists a solution to
Eq. (S.21), the curve µβ always crosses the largest eigenvalue line most-to-the-left than for any other of the eigenvalues,
due to the decreasing behavior of µβ . Thus, we can safely say express that
βc =
µ
Λmax(B)
, (S.22)
which is the final implicit equation for the epidemic threshold βc. In Fig. S12 we have made use of an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
network with 100 nodes, average degree 〈k〉 = 6, and setting µ = 0.5, but the previous result is general no matter the
network or the parameters.
Section S4. Data description
Description of the 27 real networks used in Figs. 6 and S11, sorted by increasing number of nodes. They have been
obtained from the Network Repository (http://networkrepository.com). Table S1 provides their main structural
characteristics.
ia-infect-dublin: Human contact network where nodes represent humans and edges represent proximity (i.e., contacts
in the physical world), during the Infectious SocioPatterns event that took place at the Science Gallery in Dublin,
Ireland.
soc-wiki-Vote: Wikipedia voting data from the inception of Wikipedia till January 2008. Nodes represent Wikipedia
users and a directed edge from node i to node j represents that user i voted on user j.
ca-CSphd: Genealogy network of PhD’s in computer science.
ia-fb-messages: The Facebook-like Social Network originate from an online community for students at University
of California, Irvine. The dataset includes the users that sent or received at least one message.
soc-hamsterster: Network of the friendship and family links between users of Hamsterster social network.
socfb-USFCA72: A social friendship network extracted from Facebook consisting of people (nodes) with edges
representing friendship ties.
socfb-nips-ego: A social friendship network extracted from Facebook consisting of people (nodes) with edges repre-
senting friendship ties.
socfb-Santa74: A social friendship network extracted from Facebook consisting of people (nodes) with edges repre-
senting friendship ties.
ca-GrQc: Collaboration network of arXiv General Relativity. Nodes represent scientists, and links coauthorship.
web-spam: Web Spam Challenge 2008 network.
power-US-Grid: US Power grid graph.
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ca-Erdos992: Erdo˝s collaboration network. Nodes represent scientists, and links coauthorship.
soc-advogato: Advogato is a social community platform where users can explicitly express weighted trust relation-
ships among themselves. The dataset contains a list of all of the user-to-user links.
p2p-Gnutella08: Gnutella peer to peer network from August 8 2002.
ia-reality: Reality mining network data consists of human mobile phone call events between a small set of core users
at the MIT whom actually were assigned mobile phones for which all calls were collected. A node represents a
person; an edge indicates a phone call or voicemail between two users.
ca-HepTh: Collaboration network of arXiv High Energy Physics Theory. Nodes represent scientists, and links
coauthorship.
soc-anybeat: Anybeat is an online community, a public gathering place where you can interact with people from
around your neighborhood or across the world.
ca-AstroPh: Collaboration network of arXiv Astrophysics. Nodes represent scientists, and links coauthorship.
ca-CondMat: Collaboration network of arXiv Condensed Matter. Nodes represent scientists, and links coauthorship.
soc-gplus: Google+ social network.
tech-as-caida2007: Internet network at the level of autonomous systems as of 2017. Nodes represent autonomous
systems, and there exists a link between them if they have a business agreement for the routing of packets.
ia-email-EU: The network was generated using email data from a large European research institution. Nodes are
users and edges represent email exchanges between two users in both directions.
ia-enron-large: Network of emails exchanged between senior managers of Enron Corporation, during the period
which lead to its bankruptcy.
soc-brightkite: Brightkite is a location-based social networking service provider where users shared their locations
by checking-in. The dataset contains all links among users.
soc-epinions: Who-trust-whom online social network of the general consumer review site Epinions.com.
soc-slashdot: A technology-related news website known for its specific user community. The dataset contains
friend/foe tags between the users of slashdot.
soc-twitter-follows: Twitter follower network.
The prefix in the name of each network indicates the cathegory it belongs to, namely: (ia) interaction networks; (soc)
social networks; (ca) collaboration networks; (socfb) Facebook networks; (web) we graphs; (power) power networks;
(p2p) peer to peer networks; (tech) technological networks.
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Fig. S1. Ratio between the link epidemic importance IA of a link in a subnetwork A and the link epidemic importance IAB
of a link that acts as the only bridge between subnetworks A and B. First, we fix the average degree 〈k〉B of subnetwork B (or
equivalently, we fix its incidence ρB , the red circles), and then we consider subnetworks A with average degree (and epidemic
incidence) larger than that of B, i.e. 〈k〉A > 〈k〉B (thus, ρA > ρB). We can see that, in all cases, IA > IAB , meaning that
the ranking by link epidemic importance will not be leaded by the bridges. The vertical dotted line highlights the asymptote
at ρ = 1/(1 + µ). The inset shows the relationship between the incidence and the average degree. We have set the epidemic
parameters to µ = 0.5 and β = 0.1, and the calculations rely on a nonperturbative homogeneous mean field approximation
(npHoMF). See section S1 for further details.
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Fig. S2. Epidemic containment for a network with 5000 nodes, power-law degree distribution of exponent 3, and average
degree 〈k〉 = 6. Five containment strategies are compared: maximum probability of being infected (Node Infectivity), random
link selection (Random), maximum edge betweenness (Betweenness), maximum eigenscore (EigenScore), and maximum link
epidemic importance (Link Importance). In the horizontal axis we represent the fraction of removed links during the containment
process (Lr/L). We show, from top to bottom: ρ, incidence of the epidemics on the network; ρGCC, incidence of the epidemics
on the Giant Connected Component; Cr, number of connected components; NGCC, size of the GCC; NSLCC, size of the Second
Largest Connected Component. The dots mark the achievement of total containment.
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Fig. S3. Epidemic containment for a network with 5000 nodes, power-law degree distribution of exponent 3, high clustering
coefficient, and average degree 〈k〉 = 6 (see Methods for more details). Five containment strategies are compared: maximum
probability of being infected (Node Infectivity), random link selection (Random), maximum edge betweenness (Betweenness),
maximum eigenscore (EigenScore), and maximum link epidemic importance (Link Importance). In the horizontal axis we
represent the fraction of removed links during the containment process (Lr/L). We show, from top to bottom: ρ, incidence of
the epidemics on the network; ρGCC, incidence of the epidemics on the Giant Connected Component; Cr, number of connected
components; NGCC, size of the GCC; NSLCC, size of the Second Largest Connected Component. The dots mark the achievement
of total containment.
21
ρ
ρ G
CC
C r
N
G
CC
N
SL
CC
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0
1000
2000
3000
0
1000
2000
3000
0
200
400
600
Lr L0
Node Infectivity
Random
Betweenness
EigenScore
Link Importance
Air Transportation
Fig. S4. Epidemic containment for the air transportation network (see Methods for more details). Five containment strategies
are compared: maximum probability of being infected (Node Infectivity), random link selection (Random), maximum edge
betweenness (Betweenness), maximum eigenscore (EigenScore), and maximum link epidemic importance (Link Importance).
In the horizontal axis we represent the fraction of removed links during the containment process (Lr/L). We show, from top to
bottom: ρ, incidence of the epidemics on the network; ρGCC, incidence of the epidemics on the Giant Connected Component;
Cr, number of connected components; NGCC, size of the GCC; NSLCC, size of the Second Largest Connected Component. The
dots mark the achievement of total containment.
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Fig. S5. Epidemic containment for the general relativity collaborations network (see Methods for more details). Five con-
tainment strategies are compared: maximum probability of being infected (Node Infectivity), random link selection (Random),
maximum edge betweenness (Betweenness), maximum eigenscore (EigenScore), and maximum link epidemic importance (Link
Importance). In the horizontal axis we represent the fraction of removed links during the containment process (Lr/L). We
show, from top to bottom: ρ, incidence of the epidemics on the network; ρGCC, incidence of the epidemics on the Giant
Connected Component; Cr, number of connected components; NGCC, size of the GCC; NSLCC, size of the Second Largest
Connected Component. The dots mark the achievement of total containment.
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Fig. S6. Epidemic containment for an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with 5000 nodes and average degree 〈k〉 = 6. Five contain-
ment strategies are compared: maximum probability of being infected (Node Infectivity), random link selection (Random),
maximum edge betweenness (Betweenness), maximum eigenscore (EigenScore), and maximum link epidemic importance (Link
Importance). In the horizontal axis we represent the fraction of removed links during the containment process (Lr/L). We
show, from top to bottom: ρ, incidence of the epidemics on the network; ρGCC, incidence of the epidemics on the Giant
Connected Component; Cr, number of connected components; NGCC, size of the GCC; NSLCC, size of the Second Largest
Connected Component. The dots mark the achievement of total containment. We observe that the containment is similar to
the one in the power-law network in Fig. S2 due to the absence of transitivity and modular structure.
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Fig. S7. Epidemic containment for a network with 5000 nodes generated with a Stochastic Block Model, with 4 blocks of
250 nodes, 2 blocks of 1000 nodes, and 1 block of 2000 nodes, average degree 5 and mixing probability 0.3. Five contain-
ment strategies are compared: maximum probability of being infected (Node Infectivity), random link selection (Random),
maximum edge betweenness (Betweenness), maximum eigenscore (EigenScore), and maximum link epidemic importance (Link
Importance). In the horizontal axis we represent the fraction of removed links during the containment process (Lr/L). We
show, from top to bottom: ρ, incidence of the epidemics on the network; ρGCC, incidence of the epidemics on the Giant
Connected Component; Cr, number of connected components; NGCC, size of the GCC; NSLCC, size of the Second Largest
Connected Component. The dots mark the achievement of total containment. We observe that our containment strategy based
on link epidemic importance outperforms all other methods except eigenscore, with similar results, and the large fragmentation
induced by the other strategies.
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Fig. S8. Epidemic containment for a network with 5000 nodes generated using the LFR algorithm [Lancichinetti et al.,
Phys. Rev. E, 78 (2008) 046110], with average degree 6, exponent 3, and mixing probability 0.1. Five containment strategies
are compared: maximum probability of being infected (Node Infectivity), random link selection (Random), maximum edge
betweenness (Betweenness), maximum eigenscore (EigenScore), and maximum link epidemic importance (Link Importance).
In the horizontal axis we represent the fraction of removed links during the containment process (Lr/L). We show, from top to
bottom: ρ, incidence of the epidemics on the network; ρGCC, incidence of the epidemics on the Giant Connected Component;
Cr, number of connected components; NGCC, size of the GCC; NSLCC, size of the Second Largest Connected Component.
The dots mark the achievement of total containment. We observe that our containment strategy based on link epidemic
importance outperforms all other methods except eigenscore, with similar results, and the large fragmentation induced by the
other approaches.
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Fig. S9. Original air transportation network (top) and the results after a removal of 33.3% of the links using link epidemic
importance (middle) and edge betweenness (bottom). Nodes and edges with the same color belong to the same connected
component, with subcritical components in gray scale and using darker gray for larger components. The area of the nodes is
proportional to their probability of being infected. We have set the epidemic parameters to µ = 0.5 and β = 0.06.
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Fig. S10. Comparison of the number of connected components after total containment between the link epidemic importance
strategy and the other four methods, calculated for the synthetic networks and parameters as in Fig. 4.
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Fig. S11. Comparison of the number of connected components after total containment between the link epidemic importance
and eigenscore strategies, calculated for the real networks and parameters as in Fig. 5.
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Fig. S12. Graphical representation of the determination of the epidemic threshold. The solid lines show the 10 largest
eigenvalues of matrix B, which depends on the infection probability β and the recovery probability µ, for an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
network of 100 nodes, average degree 〈k〉 = 6, and setting µ = 0.5. For the epidemic threshold, the eigenvalue must be equal
to µ
βc
, thus it must lay at the intersection between the eigenvalues curves and the dashed line µ
β
. From those intersections,
the one providing the smallest value of β is given by the largest eigenvalue of B, thus showing that βc =
µ
Λmax(B)
, which is an
implicit equation for the epidemic threshold.
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Fig. S13. Computational time invested for each method to perform a single ranking and removal for Baraba´si-Albert networks
ranging from 100 to 400,000 nodes, averaged over 36 repetitions. The standard deviations are included as ribbons on the plot.
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Table S1. Structural characteristics of the 27 real networks obtained from the Network Repository (http://
networkrepository.com) and used in Fig. 6 and fig. S11. They correspond to the largest connected component of the networks
with the same name in the repository. The structural descriptors shown are the number of nodes N , the number of links L,
the average degree 〈k〉, the clustering coefficient c, and the assortativity r.
Name N L 〈k〉 c r
ia-infect-dublin 410 2765 13.4878 0.1452 0.0000
soc-wiki-Vote 889 2914 6.5557 0.0901 -0.0556
ca-CSphd 1025 1043 2.0351 0.0023 -0.2532
ia-fb-messages 1266 6451 10.1912 0.6289 0.6392
soc-hamsterster 2000 16097 16.0970 0.0268 -0.3816
socfb-USFCA72 2672 65244 48.8353 0.0037 -0.3886
socfb-nips-ego 2888 2981 2.0644 0.3178 0.2013
socfb-Santa74 3578 151747 84.8222 0.2618 0.1253
ca-GrQc 4158 13422 6.4560 0.2294 0.0227
web-spam 4767 37375 15.6807 0.0006 -0.8764
power-US-Grid 4941 6594 2.6691 0.0925 -0.0952
ca-Erdos992 4991 7428 2.9766 0.0439 -0.0844
soc-advogato 5054 39374 15.5813 0.0207 0.0355
p2p-Gnutella08 6299 20776 6.5966 0.0420 -0.4531
ia-reality 6809 7680 2.2558 0.1032 0.0035
ca-HepTh 8638 24806 5.7435 0.1907 0.0917
soc-anybeat 12645 49132 7.7710 0.0024 -0.6753
ca-AstroPh 17903 196972 22.0044 0.4357 0.2258
ca-CondMat 21363 91286 8.5462 0.1273 -0.0288
soc-gplus 23576 39145 3.3207 0.0073 -0.1946
tech-as-caida2007 26475 53381 4.0326 0.0260 -0.0651
ia-email-EU 32430 54397 3.3547 0.0004 -0.6682
ia-enron-large 33696 180811 10.7319 0.2022 0.0706
soc-brightkite 56739 212945 7.5061 0.2811 0.2389
soc-epinions 61355 494372 16.1151 0.0217 -0.1234
soc-slashdot 70068 358647 10.2371 0.0851 -0.1165
soc-twitter-follows 404719 713319 3.5250 0.1105 0.0096
